George
Roggie Reading Reflection Essay Journal Gov 97 Spring 2024
Week 1: Camus Myth of Sisyphus; The Dhammapada
This week’s readings,
particularly Camus’ Myth of Sisyphus,
required multiple perusals for me to come to any sort of adequate
conclusion.
Upon first read, I interpreted
Camus and the Buddha as proposing diametrically opposite viewpoints with
regards to the absurdity of life and the promise of death. My initial reaction
was that, whereas the Buddha’s belief in an afterlife reflective of one’s
behavior while living induces him to advocate for good behavior during one’s
life, Camus’ understanding of human suffering as “absurd” drives him nearly to
the point of advocating for suicide.
This understanding proved incorrect upon a
second read. I now believe Camus’ and the
Buddha’s arguments to be deceptively
similar. The Buddha’s stance is clear:
They
rejoice here, they rejoice after death;
Those
who have done good deeds rejoice in both places;
In simple terms, his message is
that people who live good lives in which they choose fulfillment with what they
have over agonizing over what they don’t have continue to feel those positive
sentiments after death. Camus, despite not providing any evidence of a belief
in the afterlife, argues for that same fulfillment, even when one’s life is
superficially unfulfilling – or, as he terms it, absurd.
To further the claim that Camus
and the Buddha make similar arguments, let us imagine what advice the Buddha
would give Sisyphus. The Buddha would likely advise Sisyphus to find
contentment in his toil, for such contentment would persist after death. That
Sisyphus indeed finds such a sentiment is the root of Camus’ interest in his
story; in fact, one could argue that the bulk of the work Camus does in his Myth of Sisyphus is to identify in the
myth a manifestation of the Buddhist belief in the importance of one’s worldly
behavior.
Week 2: The Body in Pain (Scarry), Pain: A Political History
(Wailoo)
The part of this
week’s reading of Elaine Scarry’s Body in
Pain that has most stuck with me is her insistence that the feeling of pain
is completely inaccessible to all but those who are experiencing it. Her
example of the disdain one might feel for a person who, when tortured,
confesses/gives up information – or, in colloquial terms, “cracks” – rings true
to me. There is certainly a negative connotation associated with people on whom
torture is effective, and a positive connotation associated with those who are
able to withstand it.
When I am in pain, I usually feels some sort of regret: after
being hit by a fastball, I think,
“why did I choose to play recreational baseball?” After
eating too much, I think, “I should have eaten less!” But I continue to play
baseball, and I continue to eat a lot, despite having experienced the
consequences. Based on Scarry’s work, I posit that my inability to learn from
previously experienced pain is directly tied to pain’s inaccessibility to those
who are not feeling it. When I start a baseball game, I don’t expect to get hit
by a pitch, so I’m not afraid of it. When
I begin a meal, I can’t feel the
pain of overeating; thus, I am not afraid of eventually experiencing it.
I do wonder if the history of battlefield
injury care (i.e. amputations without anesthesia) can be attributed to this
ignorance. The Wailoo reading reminded me of the horrific stories told about
military medical care during the US Civil War; if the doctors performing such
barbarous procedures felt the same pain as their patients, would medical care
have been different? I think it’s a question worth discussing.
Week 3: Courtwright, Meldrum, McNeil
David McNeil’s
article, “Opiophobia Has Left Africa in Agony” is one of the most striking
pieces of journalism I have ever read. For my whole life, I’ve been hearing
about the dangers of overusing opioids, and I’ve taken multiple college courses
that included weeks focused on finding ways of stopping doctors from
overprescribing opioids and other painkillers. I have never heard about, nor
have I considered the possibility of, an opioid shortage. I think this can be
attributed to the fact that the political culture in which I grew up is
one-sided on this issue, perhaps because my home (the Washington DC suburbs) is
not a place where opioid addiction is particularly prevalent. When people in
affluent, generally healthy areas talk about curbing opioid addiction and
prescription, they are talking about people whose lives don’t look anything
like the life of a DC consultant or lawyer.
It feels as though the mainstream has
settled upon the opinion that opioids are bad and their use should be curbed.
It is an opinion held by those privileged people who don’t often experience
pain like the pain experienced by the people in the McNeil argument. This, I
think, is a core tenet of pain’s role in public debate; those who don’t
experience the pain in question have
completely different perspectives than
those who do.
It is indeed the
bias that addicts must somehow look like addicts that Courtwright discusses. He
writes that as addicts began to come from lower class backgrounds, doctors
became less tolerant of them, driving the trade of opiates partially
underground. Courtwright writes: “what we think about addiction very much
depends on who is addicted.” This is true both in a political sense – one
imagines the “War on Drugs” would have looked very different if the
demographics of addicts had been different – and a medical sense, as one
imagines the people experiencing pain in Africa would have excellent access to
relief if they instead lived on the Upper West Side of Manhattan.
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